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suggestions.I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to present an analysis of the stylized facts associated with the
currency crisis in 1994.,  and briefly interpret the experience in light of the recent crisis literature.
Although interest in currency and banking crises have intensified  in the aftermath of the ERM,
Mexican and more recently Thai crises, the dynamics of the Turkish crisis, -which is different than
the aforementioned crises owing to the fact that the exchange rate was governed by a managed
float, rather than being fixed - has not been discussed widely in the literature.
In the aftermath of the crisis in 1994, the Turkish economy contracted by 6%, the highest
level of annual output loss in the history of the Turkish Republic. In the first quarter of 1994, the
Turkish Lira (TL) was devalued more than 50% against the US$, the Central Bank lost half of its
reserves, interest rates skyrocketed, and the inflation rate reached three digit levels. A stabilization
program, later supported by an IMF Stand-By was launched on April 5th, 1994, but no success
has yet been  achieved in implementing  any of the structural adjustment measures.
Turkey experienced large and growing fiscal and external imbalances  following the capital
account liberalization in 1989, until the first quarter of 1994, and during that period the real
exchange rate appreciation was no less than 20 %. Against this background of rising and very
high PSBR, (about 10 and 12% in 1992 and 1993 respectively) there were remarkable policy
mistakes committed on the monetary front. Towards lowering the very high levels of domestic
public debt stock through cutting interest rates on Treasury bills, there was a shift towards deficit
financing through monetization beginning in the last months of 1993. Several auctions of short
term maturity Treasury bills were canceled one after another and the Treasury started to rely on
Icash advances from the Central Bank instead. Still, the announced government budget for 1994
did not contain any measures towards tightening. While these caused increasing levels of anxiety
in the financial sector, Turkey's credit rating was downgraded by some major international
agencies. The commercial banks that had engaged in heavy offshore borrowing in 1992-93 and
held mainly TL denominated assets, hastened the process of acquiring foreign currency to close
their open foreign currency positions and there was some capital flight. The Central Bank, aiming
to defend the currency and to contain the loss of foreign currency reserves, started to heavily
intervene in the interbank market and raised the overnight rate to record levels. Yet, the Central
Bank still went on losing reserves - selling  foreign currency to the commercial banks, and the
commercial  banks which were able to buy foreign currency from the Central Bank at relatively
inexpensive rates started to lose their own reserves as residents started to withdraw their foreign
exchange deposits. The liquidity  build-up through excessive creation of domestic credit to the
public sector in the form of cash advances to the Treasury by the Central Bank, and the decline in
total foreign exchange reserves in the first quarter of 1994 finally had its impact on the parity:
from about 15,000 TL/$ in January 1994, the parity more than doubled to 35,000 TL/$ by the
first days of April 1994.
After the crisis, some academic and policy circles in Turkey strongly defended the idea
that the crisis was the natural outcome of the interventions in the domestic borrowing market: had
there not been any attempted intervention on the rates at which the Treasury was borrowing (by
canceling auctions, fixing  the upper limit or by offering small amounts), the crisis could have been
2avoided'. This view implied  the determinants of the crisis to be within the domestic capital
markets, and thus neglected the importance of the fundamentals. Others suggested that such a
sharp real exchange rate correction was inevitable, given the external imbalances. Another line of
argument was that the highly deteriorated fundamentals, namely soaring public deficits provided a
backdrop where avoiding such an event was almost unavoidable. The extent to which underlying
disequilibria  in macroeconomic variables and/or policy errors contributed to the crisis is  an issue
considered in the analysis  of stylized facts.
Section II describes the evolution of the external balances following the trade liberalization
of the early 80s, and discusses the broad economic conditions during 1990-93. Section III
describes the fiscal imbalances and the public sector financing mix during the same time. Section
IV describes the events in the financial  markets that led to the eventual crash in the first quarter of
1994. Section V summarizes the effects of this substantial devaluation and fiscal tightening on the
output of the economy, that is, how the demand and supply side factors interacted and led to the
contraction after the first quarter of 1994. Section VI briefly discusses whether the elements of
the Turkish Crisis are explained in the recent crisis literature, and section VII concludes.
I Ozatay (1996) presents a detailed account of the developments in the Treasury
borrowing market in late 1993-1994.
3II. GROWING EXTERNAL IMBALANCES AND THE BROAD ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS IN 1990-93
The 1978-80 debt crisis marked the end of the inward orientation of the Turkish economy
and hence the import substitution motive in the trade regime. The 1980-83 period under military
rule was characterized by economic stabilization and trade liberalization at the same time. Real
exchange rate depreciation and export promoting strategies led to strong export growth.
Restrictive wage policies enhanced saving mainly in the public sector, curbed domestic absorption
and hence promoted export expansion. The real depreciation of the TL and the repression of real
wages continued during the 1984-87 period of civilian administration and supported the trade
reforms of the period. Imports were liberalized gradually after 1983, and in 1989 tariffs were
lowered to a large extent as part of a program aiming to fight inflation and in 1990 nearly all
quantity and price restrictions were removed.
From 1984 on, Turkish citizens were allowed to hold deposits denominated in foreign
currency. Starting in 1988 and by the end of 1989, the process of capital account liberalization
was completed; capital flows were fully liberalized in the external accounts. This reversed the
major exchange rate trends that prevailed till then, the cumulative appreciation of the real
exchange rate amounted to no less than 20% during 1989-90. The liberalization of capital flows
increased the interest rates as well, as in many financial liberalization episodes 2. The 1989 tariff
2  See Saracoglu (1996) and World Bank (1997).
4reductions combined with currency appreciation led to an import boom 3 and deteriorated the trade
balance in 1990: the deficit doubled in 1990. Table 1 documents the balance of payments and
some other key econornic indicators of Turkey, after 1990, when trade and financial  liberalization
were complete. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the real exchange rate (TL/$) after 1986 together
with a fitted simple linear time trend. There has been a sustained tendency for the real exchange
rate to decrease over time (i.e. to appreciate), and the real exchange rate was over appreciated,
that is, "stayed below its trend", after capital flows were liberalized, from the second half of 1988
to January 1994, when a sharp correction in the nominal rate came to make up for the inflation
differential. Figure 2 shows a TL/$-DM real exchange rate index together with a real labor cost
index. The sharp increase in the real labor cost that coincided with the real exchange rate
appreciation shows how the economy became less competitive after 1988. Domestic inputs
(labor) became more costly, and the real cost of tradables declined. The export-led growth of
early to mid 80s was replaced with domestic demand led growth and external imbalances
widened, the trade deficit went up from 3% of GNP in 1992 to 8.5% in 1993.
With regards to the saving - investment gaps implied by the current account deficits of
1990-93; private savings in Turkey during that period have been almost constant, if not slightly
increasing, but the absence of inflation accounting implies that private disposable income is not
corrected for inflation  tax, whereas consumption is deflated fully, which produces an upward bias
3Real wage repression, a politically  unsustainable aspect of macroeconomic adjustment
during 1981-87 could not be sustained after the 1987 elections. The real wage recovery was
rapid; the 1988-89 period saw a sharp increase in wages: 129% in private and 188% in the public
sector. (A further strain on the public sector which was burdened by the debt repayments after
1985) Celasun (1995) decomposes the sources of import growth between 85-90 using the  input-
output framework, and finds that 60% of his growth was attributable to domestic final demand
expansion. This trend must have continued well till the import explosion of 1993.
5in the measurement of private savings. The public sector however, has been in a continuous state
of dissaving during the same period. (See Figures 3a and 3b) Given that the currency crisis was
triggered by the eventual mismanagement  of this growing amount of public sector debt, we now
turn to analyzing  the public sector.
III. FISCAL IMBALANCES AND PATTERNS OF FINANCING IN 1990-93
The liberalization of the capital account in Turkey took place against a background of
macro-populism and mounting fiscal imbalances. The public sector borrowing requirement
(PSBR) of Turkey rose steadily between 1988 and 1993, as shown in Figures 4-5, where the gap
between public sector revenue and expenditure is widening between 1989 and 1993, and the
PSBR is increasing along with the primary deficit, which excludes the interest payments of the
non-financial  public sector. The gap between the PSBR and the primary deficit started to widen
after 1992, as interest payments on existing debt became an increasing burden.
The reasons for this growth in public expenditures were increases in the total wage bill of
the government, generous agricultural support policies, worsening performance of the state
owned economic enterprises (SEE), the increased cost of military operations in the southeastern
region of the country, and increased interest payments after 1992. The privatization of the SEEs
has been a source of "expected public revenue" especially after 1993, but no success in this area
was achieved as the Constitutional Court deemed the Privatization Law unconstitutional in 1994.
(This ruling of the court was removed in early 1997)
After 1989, the borrowings of the public sector became increasingly dependent on foreign
6savings. It was agreed in early 1989 that the Central Bank's financing of the Treasury would not
exceed 15% of the total budgetary appropriations. The Central Bank started to implement a
monetary program in 1989, with the aim of restructuring its balance sheet 4. The Central Bank was
restricting credit to commercial banks too, and liquidity  would be created basically against foreign
assets. The financing of public sector deficits were shifted to domestic borrowing, and the share of
external borrowing was to be reduced. External borrowing was delegated to private financial
institutions, mainly to commercial banks, which were the main source of demand for domestic
debt instruments. As the foreign exchange purchases of the Central Bank became the main source
of money creation, the ultimate source of public debt financing were short term capital inflows.
Ekinci (1996) notes that of the 7.2 billion dollars of external debt accumulation in 1990, 3.8
billion was short term, and 60% of that amount was in the form of short-term foreign liabilities  of
the commercial  banking sector. The medium term success of this program in terms of lowering
inflation in the absence of any fiscal adjustment however was low: as will be described below, the
increased burden of domestic debt and the eventual shift towards Central Bank financing of the
Treasury would lead to the crisis of 1994, eventually increasing the inflation plateau. The share of
domestic debt (as opposed to external financing) increased until 1992, when it constituted almost
all of the financing, but then suppressed in 1993, with an important share in it being Central Bank
advances. In the crisis year of 1994 however, domestic borrowing rebounded not only to finance
the government deficit but also the repayments of accumulated external debt. Next I turn to
briefly describing the patterns of the financing mix during the last years leading up to the crisis.
4 Ekinci (1996) notes that the program mainly involved targeted growth rates for different
entries in the balance sheet, and one of the objectives was to reduce foreign currency liabilities  to
residents, implying reverse currency substitution.
7The capital flows to Turkey are shown in Figure 6a, and the interest rate differential in
Figure 6b. In 1990 the flows were strong, and conditions for domestic bond financing were
favorable. In 1991 however the Gulf War took place and led to uncertainties and minor panics in
the financial markets. This resulted in increases in interest rates, shortening of debt maturity, and
also put constraints on foreign financing.
The widening of the fiscal deficit had impacts on the governments financing policy mix and
patterns of financing started to change after 1991. In November 1991 there were general elections
and the government changed. The new government announced a program aiming at lowering
inflation,  through reducing the public deficit, but it soon became clear that the high level of
interest payments were seen as a potential area for savings. In 1992, facing high levels of domestic
debt service payments, the government increased the share of money financing. It used almost all
of its short term advances from the Central Bank up to its legal limit during the first half of the
year, shifted towards longer maturities in its domestic financing and abandoned its policy of
keeping external borrowing at about the level of principal repayments, and borrowed about $1
million  in international  bond markets.
In the second half of 1992 however, it became evident that reliance on short term cash
advances from the Central Bank to keep interest rates from rising resulted in pressure on the
TL/$ exchange rate, and hence on the Central Bank's foreign exchange position, thus the
Treasury accepted a 10% increase on the 3 monthly T-bills and also obtained another $1.5 billion
of external funds.
With regards to the currency crisis of early 1994, analyzing the debt financing mix of
1993, especially  that of the second half, is important. Not only were public sector expenditures
8booming at that time 5, but there was also a shift towards money financing of expenditures, and
cancellations of Treasury auctions at the end of 1993. Ozatay (1996) argues that the Turkish
government had become "insolvent" already by the end of 1992, and that the timing of the crisis
specifically at the beginning of 1994 was due to the interventions in the domestic borrowing
market. He tests the stationarity (as a condition for sustainability)  of the discounted real domestic
debt stock from 1985.07 on, and finds that there is a unit root in the process, no matter whether
the sample end point is 1992.12, or 1993.08 or 1993.12. He concludes that the economy was
vulnerable to a funding crisis as of the end of 1992, but the loss of confidence caused by
developments in the borrowing process of the Treasury at the end of 1993 determined the timing
of the crisis. Comparing the case of Turkey with the funding crises in several European countries
in the 1920's ( France, Belgium, Italy ,Portugal and Greece - most of which had actually corrected
their fiscal fundamentals by that time), he concludes that such crises were triggered by problems in
debt management policy: namely by offering interest rates at less than market clearing levels and
attributes the timing of the Turkish crisis to the debt mismanagement  of late 1993 to early 1994.
The first half of 1993 saw an increased burden of interest payments on domestic and
foreign financing of 1992. Yet the Treasury's budgeting program restated the goals of lowering
the interest payments and lengthening the maturity of domestic borrowing. Still, the majority of
financing came from short term borrowing, the interest rates on which were gradually reduced.
5 It should be noted that a significant  reason for the large public expenditures of late 1993
and early 1994 was the local elections to be held on March 27,1994. Because of these elections,
the prices on SEE produced goods were not increased "on time", and changes in these were
lagging well behind the inflation rate. The public, having learned from past experiences, knew
with certainty that these government administered prices would go up in a few days after the local
elections.
9(By 13% on 3-monthly, and 2% points on 6-monthly bills) The rates on longer term maturities
were increased. $1.7 billion was borrowed in international markets,  and half of the legal limit on
Central Bank advances was used.
It was the second half of 1993 that saw a great deal of policy changes. In the beginning of
1993, there was a change in party leadership of the leading coalition partner DYP, and Ms. Ciller
was elected as PM in mid June. Towards the end of July, the Central Bank governor resigned as a
result of disagreements between him and the PM on the conduct of monetary policy. In the
meanwhile,  it was often stated by the government that the most important short term policy goal
was to lower the burden of the share of interest payments on short term debt, by lowering the
nominal interest rates. Thereafter until the beginning of 1994, instead of trying to correct the
fundamentals that led to this problem, the government tried to control the interest rates, that is
attacked the symptoms of the problem rather than the cause. This attempt of trying to lower
interest rates on debt at such high levels of PSBR (12.4 % in 1993) proved to be a very dangerous
one.
VI. MONETIZATION, DOLLARIZATION, AND THE TURBULENCE IN THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS IN LATE 1993-EARLY 1994
Based on two laws passed in August and October 1993, the Short Term Cash Advance
(STA) facility 6 of the Turkish Central Bank to the Treasury was extended. In August 1993, the
6 STA is the facility through which the Central Bank extends domestic credit to the
Treasury, that is, the public sector. The Treasury in turn, gives interest free paper to the Central
Bank.
10accumulated debt of the Central Bank to the Treasury due to former STA's.  were canceled, and
through an annexed budget, an additional 26.8 trillion TL was made available to the Treasury.
(The original limit  was 28.8 trillion) The developments at the domestic borrowing market as
described below explains the reasons for the Treasury to use up not only all of these resources by
the end of 1993, but also 53% of the legal limit for 1994 (TL 52.4 trillion) in only the first 3
weeks of 1994. Figure 7 shows the path of domestic credit extended by the Central Bank to the
Treasury. The sharp and sustained increase after October 1993 until April 1994 shows the extent
of liquidity that was pumped in to the system. Figures 8a and 8b show how during the same
months the Central Bank was losing its foreign exchange reserves. To assess the extent of excess
liquidity in the system, a money demand equation was estimated in the fashion of Kaminsky and
Reinhart(1996). In the model, the measure of excess real balances are associated with sustained
positive residuals in a money demand equation (the measure used is narrow money, i.e. Ml),
implying  money creation over and above money demand 7 . The residuals of the regression are
indeed positive during the whole of 1993, and the last two months of 1992 implying excess
liquidity in the system prior to the crisis. The possible sources of the sustained positive residuals
are discussed and results of the regression and a graph of the residuals are presented in the
appendix.
7 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) use this measure as one of the many indicators that may
signal a forthcoming balance of payments or banking crisis. The motivation is due to possible
excess supply prior to the crisis due to deficit financing a la Krugman (1979), or a decrease in
money demand a la Calvo and Mendoza (1996). The pattern emerging from this indicator in their
cross-country framework is not clear, and they note the shortcomings of the money demand
estimation, including measurement and stability issues. As for the 1994 Turkish crisis however,
the regression results, -subject to the problems mentioned above-, seem to be clearly indicative of
excess liquidity in the economy before the crash.
11During the second half of 1993, the Treasury continued to finance the growing deficit, but
at the same time limited the share of 3-month paper to an insignificant  amount. The average
maturity of domestic debt stock was on a steadily declining  path till then, as shown in Figure 9.
Against that background, the rates on 3-month bills were suppressed down 4-5% points, while 6-
12 monthly borrowing increased with increased rates of 2-3% points. External funding amounting
to US$2 billion was obtained and reliance on Central Bank financing increased.
In the last quarter of 1993, the Treasury started to cancel auctions altogether. In
November 1993, 4 out of 5 were canceled, namely those with 3, 6 and 9 monthly maturities.
Similarly,  in December 1993, no bills with maturities shorter than a year were auctioned.
The auctions of September, October, November and December of 1993 are summarized in
Table 2. The cancellations of auctions, and the acceptance rates on 3, 6, 9 monthly maturity
auctions points towards the often announced aim of the Treasury: to save on interest rates, and to
increase the maturity.  ' The low amount of offers by the market participants for all maturities, in
the last two months of 1993 (shown under the entry "Amount Offered") compared to the previous
two months is striking. The "% Accepted" entry refers to the percentage of these offers that were
accepted by the Treasury. The amount of borrowing from 3 and 6 month paper was zero, and for
the 9 and 12 month bills, both the offered amounts and rates accepted were low. As domestic debt
rollover was substituted with monetization, credit to the govenment from the Central Bank
amounted to half of the annual legal limit of 1993, only in the last quarter of 1993. This
corresponded to 30% of the international reserves of the Central Bank at that time. (The
8The timing of this attempt and perhaps the attempt itself- instead led to much higher
interest rates to prevail after the crisis of March 1994, since it induced a heavy reliance on
monetization and triggered several runs on the TL.
12evolution of Central Bank Net Foreign Assets is shown in Figures 8a, 8b.)
The Treasury, after having canceled the auctions in November 1993 on the basis of high
rates (for example 73% in November) would return to the domestic borrowing market in January
1994, having used up half of the 1994 legal limit on STA's in only the first 3 weeks of the year.
this time by fixing the maximum  interest rate at 94% in simple annual terms. Yet the demand for
these bills were extremely low. The announced budget for 1994 contained no measures for fiscal
correction, price increases on SEE goods were delayed but expected to take place immediately.
after the local elections in the first couple of days of April 1994, thus inflationary  expectations
were high (Figure 10 shows the evolution of WPI and CPI ) and residents were abandoning TL
denominated assets in favor of foreign ones. Currency substitution, as proxied by the ratio of
M2Y to M2 where M2Y is a broad money measure including foreign currency deposits is shown
in Figure 11. The share of domestic currency deposits in M2Y fell from 53 percent to 42 percent
between December 1993 to April 1994 9. The evolution of foreign currency deposits at
commercial  banks is shown in Figure 12. The decline the stock amount of deposits during the
third and fourth months of 1994 corresponds to the period of large withdrawals, and then the
return to TL denominated assets, mainly government paper, in May 1994. The domestic
borrowing market would in fact disappear until May 1994, when the Treasury managed to
borrow substantial amounts again, but at compounded annual rates around 400%. Rates on 3, 6
and 9 montly bills is shown in Figure 13.
Returning to the situation in early 1994, as the domestic borrowing market of the Treasury
collapsed, the mechanism through which commercial banks borrowed at foreign markets, and at
90ECD Economic Survey on Turkey, 1995, p.23.
13the domestic market bought mainly T-bills to reap huge profits was temporarily broken. The
domestic credit extended by the Central Bank to the Treasury reached record amounts. 53% of
the limit of STA's were extended in only the first 3 weeks, which approximately corresponded to
30 % of the net foreign assets of the Central Bank, This liquidity  pumped in to the system at a
time when the demand for TL was low, led to several runs against the TL in January, February
and March 1994. The Central Bank, prior to- and in between the official devaluations, was heavily
intervening  in the overnight market to defend the parityv°,  and overnight rates did jump to
compounded annual rates exceeding 1000% at times. (See Figure 14) The percentage
depreciation of the TL was about 16, 6, 18, and 35 during the first 4 months of 1994 respectively.
The TL dropped to 39,900 against the US$ on April 7, but recovered to 33,400 TL/US$ at the
end of the month.
Now we turn to the story behind the run against the TL and the drainage of Central Bank
foreign assets in greater detail. It was noted before that an important portion of the inflows of
foreign capital to Turkey took the form of short term off-shore borrowing. Although it is not
possible to see the discrepancy between the foreign assets and liabilities  of deposit banks in IFS
data'" (See Figure 15), many commercial banks held short positions in foreign exchange, and lent
domestically at high rates, including to the Treasury. It is noted in different sources that banks had
large open positions especially  in 1993. Ozatay (1996) notes that open foreign exchange positions
10  The Central Bank Governor resigned at the end of March 1994 as a result of the
conflicts between him and the PM over the conduct of policy.
11  The IFS data on the total foreign assets and liabilities  of the Deposit Banks in Turkey
(including state owned, foreign and commercial  banks) shows the stock amounts, therefore does
not reveal the flow imbalances arising from maturity mismatch and valuation issues.
14of the commercial banks was US$4.9 billion in December 1993, and declined to US$ 1.1 billion in
June 1994. The same figure for end 1993 is noted in OECD Economic Survey on Turkey, 1995.
Short term debt instruments were not issued by the Treasury in the last two months of 1993, and
in the beginning of 1994, the stock market was in a steady decline, (see Figure 16) and the TL
was losing its value sharply against foreign currencies. The banks rushed to the foreign exchange
market to close their positions in foreign exchange, the Central Bank was defending the parity by
selling  foreign currency at rates below the market rate, as a result of which the Central Bank lost
half of its reserves while the commercial  banks closed their short positions. The fall in foreign
liabilities  of the depos:it  banks from early 1994 on is seen in Figure 15. At the same time, there
were large withdrawals of TL and foreign currency denominated deposits from the system. Three
small commercial  banks (with share in total deposits less than one percent) were placed in to
receivership in April 1994. Following that, 100% of bank deposits were insured by the Central
Bank at the end of April 1994. Although the amount of reserves were at an all time low, this
seems to have helped to stop the withdrawals. This insurance on deposits has not been removed
to date, signifying  the fragility of the system.
In April 5, about a week after the local elections, the government announced a
stabilization programme. This involved price increases of 70 to 100 percent on SEE goods, and a
freeze thereafter up to 6 months. Public sector wages would be freezed, the planned consolidated
government deficit was halved for 1994. This deficit reduction would be achieved mainly through
one-time taxes on the net assets of firms, wealth and corporate taxes, also by the real decline in
the wage bill, and a cutting down on public investment. Reserve and liquidity  requirement rules
were revised in favor of holding TL relative to foreign currency, and ratios increased in general.
15As a result, stabilization  of the TL was indeed achieved in May 1994. The Treasury
resumed domestic borrowing by offering three-month maturity paper at simple three monthly
rates of 50 percent. This coincided with a three month period of very low price and no wage
inflation (after a price level  jump in April amounting to no less than 100 percent, and a wage
freeze) so the real returns on these so called "superbonds" were immense, and demand for TL
recovered.
V. THE ECONOMIC CONTRACTION OF 1994
After the April 1994 stabilization program was announced by the government, the IMF
approved a stand-by of US$ 742 million, extended over a 14 month horizon and strongly urged
the rapid implementation of the structural reform measures. In fact, the stabilization program did
not achieve any of its medium term structural adjustment measures to date, such as the
implementation  of the privatization programme, and social security and tax reform. The budget
balance of the central government nonetheless saw a primary surplus that year, through a severely
contractionary fiscal stance. Through once-off tax measures, about 2% of GNP was raised as
public revenue. Public spending cuts through declining infrastructure investment, and freezing
public sector wages while doubling public sector prices contributed to this contractionary stance
but also had distributional  effects among different income groups. The public sector, in the need
of rolling over its debt after the crisis returned to the borrowing market willing to pay very high
rates. Through domestic borrowing in the second quarter of 1994, real returns up to 50 % were
transferred to public debt holders.
16As month on month annual inflation rates hit 150% in 1994, and as real wages fell sharply,
private consumption and investment declined. Another channel through which consumption was
affected was the high lending rates in 1994. Banks had increased their lending rates in early 1994
to more than 400%, reflecting their reluctance to lend in such an uncertain environment. As these
effects curbed aggregate demand, other effects were at work to decrease output through supply
channels. The import boom in 1993 was replaced with a very sharp contraction in 1994, after the
nominal devaluation. As imported inputs to production became much more expensive, industrial
production declined sharply in the last three quarters of 1994. Short term interest rates was
another contributing factor: as these increased sharply, the real stock of credit declined (This is
shown in Figure 17) working capital rationing took place and the aggregate supply curve shifted
upwards.
After an output loss of 6.1% in 1994, output recovery was rapid. The economy grew 7.5
and 8% in 1995 and 1996. The IMF, upon observing that no structural reform was under taken,
withdrew in the summer of 1995, and the last trench of the Stand-By was never disbursed. Early
elections entered the political agenda in mid-1995, and the correction process in the non-interest
component of the public budget started to weaken. Following general elections in the end of
1995, the coalition government changed two times in 1996, and public expenditures rose again.
Moreover, Turkey was accepted in to the EU Customs Union at the start of 1996, and the trade
balance started to deteriorate once again. The PSBR increased to  10% in 1996, under conditions
of problem-free financing, as short term capital flows in the form of foreign borrowing resumed in
1995.
17V.I. THE ELEMENTS OF TURKISH CASE IN THE CRISIS LITERATURE
The theorethical literature on balance of payments and currency crises has developed
mainly after a seminal paper by Krugman (1979). Krugman's model was one where deteriorated
fundamentals, mainly a sustained budget deficit, would cause a collapse of the fixed exchange rate
by eventually running down the international reserves to a point where a speculative attack on the
currency would erode the last stock amount of reserves and lead to the abandonment of the peg.
More recent currency crises, such as the ERM crisis in 1992 and the Mexican crisis of 1994,
revealed a shortcoming of the theorethical crisis literature that prevailed till then: the countries
experiencing currency crises and thus not being able to sustain their pegs did not necessarily have
deteriorated fundamentals  in the sense of Krugman's model. Instead, the issues that emerged were
that the government (rather than running a constant deficit as in the Krugman model) may have
multiple objectives some of which may be in conflict with the fixed exchange rate target and that
can lead to multiplicity  of equilibria and indeterminacy problems, and therefore speculative attacks
on fixed exchange rates could be self fulfilling.  Another major issue was that weaknesses in the
banking sector of a country could translate themselves in to major currency problems as in the
Mexican and Thai cases2.
The Turkish crisis fits the Krugman model quite well , in that deteriorated fiscal
fundamentals and therefore huge domestic credit expansion to the public sector eventually found
12 See, for example Obsfeld (1995) and Calvo (1995) for models with self-fulfilling  attack
features, and Calvo (1995) and Calvo and Mendoza(1996) for models and discussion on the
implications of the fragility of the financial sector. See Krugman (1996) for an overview and
discussion of the "classical" and "new" crisis models.
18its way through to substantially depreciate the currency (which was not even fixed!) in several
stages in the first four months of 1994, and resulted in the loss of foreign assets of the Central
Bank. This is also evidence that sufficiently  deteriorated macro balances can lead to drastic
corrections of the value of the currency even in the absence of an officially  pegged rate.
Prior to the crisis the TL was governed with a managed float with occasional
intervention' 3. As fiscal imbalances mounted during 1993, pressure on the TL increased, and the
interventions intensified.  Moreover, the government attemted to manipulate interest rates in the
last months of 1993 which reduced the attractiveness of TL denominated assets. While the
importance of fundamental deterioration of fiscal balances in preparing ground for the crisis is
clear, it is impossible  to rule out the role of policy errors in explaining the timing and extent of the
turbulance. The issue of the multiplicity  of Central Bank objectives as discussed in e.g. Obstfeld
(1994) is also relevant since there was heavy intervention to defend the exchange rate, but at the
same time the government had expansionary objectives before the local elections of March 1994.
As the temptation to monetize the debt to avoid borrowing at high interest rates on the part of the
government did becorne apparent to the economic agents in early 1994, they started to abandon
TL denominated assets in favor of foreign ones (for good reasons-as the TL did indeed depreciate
considerably afterwards) which resulted in no demand for government paper (at the fixed rate
auctions of January 1994), hence further monetization and further depreciation of the TL. It can
be said that the Treasury did act in a manner that pushed the system in to a worse outcome by
intervening to its domestic borrowing market. Under conditions of rather deteriorated macro
disequilibria,  major damage to credibility (if any existed) was done by cancelling Treasury
13 See OECD  (1994).
19auctions. The magnitude of the austerity measures could have been much less had the excess
liquidity buildup and the resulting dramatic exchange rate correction were avoided. The cost of
not accepting interest rates around 70-80 % in November 1993, was to accept rates around 400%
in May 1994.
A very important aspect of the Turkish crisis was that the episode when the Central Bank
was losing reserves coincides with the one when the commercial banks were closing their short
positions in foreign exchange. In that sense, the Central Bank was heavily intervening and selling
off its reserves to the banks - thus bailing them out before the discrete jumps in the exchange rate.
Therefore, the fragility of the banking sector due to currency and maturity mismatch problems
associated with their stock of their foreign debt was a very important determinant of the crisis,
and has important implications  in explaining how a non-fixed exchange rate can suffer such a large
devaluation. Future work on modeling crises where the currency is not pegged yet deteriorated
fundamentals combined with financial sector fragility  can lead to substantial  reserve losses seems
warranted.
V.11.  CONCLUSIONS
The previous sections described the events leading to the currency crisis of 1994, which
was followed by a minor banking crisis and an economic contraction of 6 percent in 1994. The
growing fiscal imbalances  following the capital account liberalization,  the appreciated exchange
rate, together with extensive short term borrowing of commercial  banks prepared the weak
economic background previous to the crisis. Abrupt shocks to the public sector financing mix at
20the end of 1993 -resulting in excessive liquidity  build-up in the financial markets- put the nail in
the coffin of this unsustainable debt financing scheme, albeit temporarily.
From what we have learned from the crisis of 1994, it seems that the declining maturity of
the domestic public debt was a very good signal that the Treasury had increasing difficulties  in
borrowing, and that a crisis was possibly coming. At a time of large and rising PSBR and
declining maturity of debt stock, interventions to decrease the interest rate and cancellations of
auctions was a poor idea, especially  when the burden of financing fell on domestic credit
expansion at a time of high currency substitution and high inflationary expectations. The low and
steadily declining average maturity of the debt stock is a measure of vulnerability  to policy shocks,
as it was a good indicator of forthcoming problems prior to the 1994 crisis.
The main underlying reason behind the crisis of 1994 was the uncontrollably growing
domestic debt stock. The deterioration of the fundamentals prior to the crisis did not bother the
policy makers or the profit making banking sector too much, under conditions of easy access to
capital markets. The perils of fast capital account liberalization without any fiscal adjustment had
become apparent in earlier stages of Turkey's financial liberalization. Celasun and Rodrik (1989)
gave early warnings of this problem and stated that the public sector budget was the "Achilles's
heel of the Turkish macroeconomy". Agenor, McDermott and Ucer (1996) recently analyzed the
link between the fiscal imbalances, capital flows and the real exchange rate in Turkey, and
suggested that positive shocks to government spending and capital flows appreciate the real
exchange rate, that capital flows indeed respond to uncovered interest differentials, and hence
avoiding huge misalignments  in the real exchange rate indeed call for substantial fiscal adjustment.
Therefore, a sustained fiscal adjustment will need to be a priority to achieve stability in the
21Turkish economy.
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23Table.1 Balance of Payments and some Key Economic Indicators of Turkey:  1990-1995
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Current Account
(US$ million)
Exports  13.0  13.7  14.9  15.6  18.4  21.9
Imports  22.6  21.0  23.1  29.8  22.6  35.2
Trade Balance  -9.6  -7.3  -8.2  -14.2  -4.2  -13.2
Current  Account  -2.6  0.3  -0.9  -6.4  2.6  -2.3
Balance
Capital Account  3.9  -1.3  2.4  6.6  -2.4  8.9
Balance
Portfolio  and
Direct Inv.  1.2  1.4  3.2  4.5  1.7  1.5
Short-Term  -0.2  -0.8  -0.9  1.4  -0.8  -0.2
Long Term  2.9  -1.9  0.2  0.8  -3.4  7.6
Change  in
Reserves  1.3  -1.0  1.5  0.3  0.2  8.8
GDP growth
1990  prices  9.4  0.3  6.4  8.1  -6.1  8.1
Inflation
(WPI,year end,%)  48.6  59.2  61.4  60.26  149.56  64.9
PSBR',(%GNP)  7.4  10.2  10.6  11.7  8.1  6.5
Domestic Non
Monetary Debt
Stock/M2Y  26.3  25.6  37.7  53.7  45.5
Average T-Bill
Rate  55.7  87.5  93.0  86.1  158.2
Average Maturity
of DomesticDebt
(Years)  2  1.5  1  1  0.7
Sources: OECD Economic Survey on Turkey, 1996, Main Economic  Indicators,  SPO,  1995, Ozatay (1996).
'Financing need of the Central Government.
24Table. 2a : Auctions of Treasury Bills and Bonds in 1993
(Billion TL)
1993.09  1993.10  1993.11  1993.12
Maturity: 12  Months
Amount  Offered  18730  28866  14942  9743
% Accepted  33.6  90.6  44.1  81.7
Max Interest  Rate  87.5  87.5  88.5  90.0
Maturity: 9 Months
Amount  Offered  20263  10699  1433  828
% Accepted  18.7  32.7  48.9  0.0
MaxInterest Rate  82.6  79.5  81.6  93.0
Maturity: 6 Months
Amount Offered  16566  10007  2917  1577
% Accepted  11.7  19.5  0.0  0.0
Max  Interest Rate  72.5  70.0  75.8  82.5
Maturity: 3 Months
Amount Offered  4521  6174  2278  1453
% Accepted  21.5  16.2  0.0  0.0
Max Interest Rate  65.1  63.4  73.3  72.7
Source:  Reproduced from Ozatay (1996), p.30.
Note:  Interest rates are simple annual rates.
25Table 2.b: Fixed Rate Auctions of T-Bills and Bonds in 1994
Auction  Maturity  Amount  Interest Rate  Auction  Maturity  Amount  Interest Rate
Dates  (days)  Sold(bill.TL)  (%)  Dates  (days)  Sold(bill.TL)  (%)
Jan 12  365  6301  94  May3  365  15  140
Jan 17  168  5522  78  May3  90  5  130
Jan 19  270  426  90  May 10  31  6458  146
Jan 19  107  473  75  May 11  31  1205  146
Jan 20  111  32  77  May 12  365  1006  299
Jan 26  182  113  81  May 12  31  455  146
Jan 26  75  48  74  May 13  31  348  146
Jan27  47  479  88  May 16  31  589  158
Jan 27  32  1025  91  May 16  90  200  160
Jan 31  91  2585  90  May 17  31  531  158
Feb 2  91  82  99  May 17  90  0
Feb 9  365  2865  125  May 18  31  2465  158
Feb 14  91  179  90  May18  90  0.1  160
Feb 14  110  3  92  May25  31  909  158
Feb 14  47  11  88  May25  90  63  160
Feb 16  270  284  115  May 31  31  10750  164
Feb 23  180  55  100  June 7  31  16686  164
Mar 2  90  45  99  June 7  90  8608  200
Mar 9  365  2432  130  June 14  180  7048  299
Mar22  180  155  104  June 14  90  31440  188
April 5  365  521  130  June 15  90  34642  178
April 12  270  6  110  June 16  90  17323  164
Source  Reproduced from Ozatay (1996), p.3 1.
Note:  Interest rates are simple annual rates.
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To assess the extent of excess liquidity in the system in the months leading up to the crisis
due to excessive credit creation by the central bank to finance the public sector, a money demand
equation was estimated in the fashion of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). In the model, the
measure of excess real balances are associated with sustained positive residuals in the money
demand equation, implying money creation over and above money demand. Real money balances
as measured by MI deflated by WPI are regressed on monthly dummies, a time trend (to account
for currency substitution and financial innovation), real GDP and WPI inflation. The estimation is
used as a first approximation of measuring the effect of excess liquidity. As noted by Kaminsky
and Reinhart, the regression is subject to several shortcomings and thus the results should not be
overinterpreted, it is merely used as an indicator of excess real balances. Therefore endogeneity,
mismeasurement and stationarity issues are ignored. Estimation results based on a sample of 69
observations between 1990.01 and 1995.09 are as expected: the time trend is significant and
negative, proxying currency substitution and the preference of holding interest bearing assets
rather than MI in an inflationary environment, and demand for real MI significantly  increases with
real output (interpolated to a monthly level) and significantly  decreases with monthly inflation.
The estimated results are as follows:
Variable  Estimated Coefficient  T-statistic
Time trend  -0.95E+9  -8.48
Real GDP  0.50  6.59
WPI Inflation  -0.17E+12  -3.23
The residuals of the regression are indeed positive during the whole of 1993, and the last
42two months of 1992 irnplying  excess liquidity in the system prior to the crisis. Figures A. 1 and
A.2 show the plot of the residuals, and the estimated and actual Ml  respectively. The source of
the sustained positive residuals could be increased money supply due to monetization of the
deficit, or accelerated currency substitution over and above what is captured by the simple time
trend due to reasons discussed in the paper. As also mentioned by Kaminsky and Reinhart,
inflation rates in the equation do not sufficiently  capture the increased opportunity cost of holding
money associated with increased risk premia as the economy is drifting towards a crisis. In our
case too, the variables in the right hand side of the equation do not capture the increased risk and
opportunity cost of holding MI resulting from adverse exchange rate expectations and the
unfavorable impact of the interventions in the Treasury borrowing market to risk of  and return to
holding non-interest bearing TL before the crisis. Therefore, the results seem to support both the
hypothesis of increased supply of money due to money financing of the deficit, hence the
importance of deteriorated fiscal fundamentals, but also the importance of the interventions in the
borrowing market of the Treasury, as those would definitely decrease the demand for narrow
money. In any case, evidence that the  increase in domestic credit led to excess liquidity in the
system is strong.
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